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I. INTRODUCTION 
Let us consider a hypothetical situation: Obioma is an indigene of 
Adele, a local community, rich in oil and gas in Federal Republic of 
Ouchi. Obioma has never appreciated the continuous flaring of gas 
by Osusu, a multi-national corporation (MNC) which has resulted in 
the darkening of the sky in his hometown of Adele. After careful 
thought of the environmental degradation, oil pollution, gas flaring 
resulting in acidic rain, he considers that the activities of Osusu had 
infringed his fundamental human rights. He enlisted the services of 
an NGO. 
Initially, they engaged in a name and shame approach to get the 
company to change. Obioma travelled approximately 800 kilometers 
to the corporate head office of Osusu to report his grievances. He 
was shocked that there was no grievance mechanism in place by the 
company. Firstly, at the company’s front gate was an inscription: 
“Direct all queries and complaints to the following numbers . . . .” 
The indicated numbers were written with paint marks which were 
almost fading. He managed to get the numbers after straining his 
eyes. The response he got from the first call was that the owner of 
the number had left the services of the company. The second number 
never went through. Dissatisfied, he went back to his community 
without any success. If those numbers were genuinely complaint 
numbers, the firm would have taken measures to update its record to 
know when a staff in charge of complaints has relocated or left the 
company. The numbers would be written legibly and boldly. The hy-
pothetical situation above is just a reflection of the level of impunity 
and destruction perpetrated by MNCs in weak zones. This unfortu-
nately is the bane of extractive resource governance in resource rich, 
sub-Saharan African nations.   
Experiences in some resource rich African countries have shown 
that MNCs neither care much about the effects of their activities, nor 
do they create a grievance mechanism to resolve conflicts arising 
from their operations. The African continent hosts over two-thirds of 
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the world’s reserves of platinum, which are essential in the electronic 
industry.2 These resources present both challenges and prospects. 
However, countries in the Global South can leverage the resources to 
accelerate broad-based economic development, poverty reduction, 
and prosperity for their citizens. Unfortunately, harnessing the bene-
fits of the resources have been problematic,3 for not only have these 
countries failed to reap the benefits of the resources, but the devel-
opment of the resources has in fact triggered violent conflicts, de-
stroyed the environment, exacerbated inequalities across gender and 
geography, displaced communities, and undermined democratic gov-
ernance. However, there are also instances where effective manage-
ment of the resources has produced sustainable and equitable human 
development.4 It is generally believed that what makes the difference 
between countries in the Global North and those of the Global South 
is the design and implementation of a broad set of policies and pro-
grams.5  
The Ruggie Framework and the Guiding Principles for its imple-
mentation place great emphasis on states as duty bearers under inter-
national law. Corporations, on the other hand, are mere subjects. 
 2.  See African Economic Outlook 2013: Structural Transformation and Natu-
ral Resources, AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 40 (2013) (citing Africa’s share of 
global production of PGMs in 2010 as 74%). 
 3.  See Hany Besada, Franklyn Lisk & Phillip Martin, Regulating Extraction 
in Africa: Towards a Framework for Accountability in the Global South, 2(1) 
GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 1, 1 (2015) (“[M]any countries do not reap the full bene-
fits of their extractive resource endowments.”). 
 4.  Id. at 8 (noting Botswana as a prime example of how best to use natural 
resources to expedite economic growth and development, while enforcing polices 
to process its mined diamonds locally and creating a strong private sector aimed at 
transforming its development path towards achieving sustainable outcomes); see 
JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 39 (2002) (explaining 
Botswana’s negotiations for control of diamond mines); see also Equity in Extrac-
tives: Stewarding Africa’s Natural Resources for All, AFRICAN PROGRESS PANEL 
14 (2013), http://app-cdn.acwupload.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/2013 
_APR_Equity_in_Extractives_25062013_ENG_HR.pdf (citing the World Bank’s 
categorization of Botswana in the upper-middle class average income group of Af-
rica’s resource rich countries). 
 5.  See generally Bonnie Campbell, Introduction, in MINING IN AFRICA: 
REGULATION AND DEVELOPMENT 1, 18-19 (Bonnie Campbell ed., 2009) (stating 
the ultimate goal of the Extractive Industries Review is to raise “social and envi-
ronmental considerations so they are balanced with economic considerations in ef-
forts at poverty alleviation through sustainable development”). 
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Remarkably, in most resource rich, conflict ridden African countries, 
corporations are the largest beneficiaries of illicit minerals being ex-
ploited. In the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), warlords and guerillas controlmineral resources in that part 
of the country. The State becomes helpless in enforcing certain min-
imum international human rights thresholds because it does not have 
control over the guerillas, yet MNCs continue to conduct business 
with these revolutionaries, thus maximizing profit at the detriment of 
the local population.  
This article challenges the notion that corporations cannot be held 
accountable for human rights violations under international law. It 
particularly discusses the extent of corporate accountability for hu-
man rights violations in Sub-Saharan Africa. Part one is the introduc-
tion. Part two focusses on contextual analysis of some case studies in 
the Global South to explore the extent of governance gaps brought 
by globalization. Part two also argues for the reputational model of 
compliance by states as a means of fulfilling their duty to protect 
human rights. Part three discusses the implementation of the Guiding 
Principles. Part four considers the various approaches through which 
the Guiding Principles, though voluntary, can be implemented in re-
source rich but weak states. Part four also discusses local participa-
tion in resource governance. It argues that the free, prior and in-
formed consent rule developed by the United Nations should be 
implemented. This will give the local communities a say on matters 
that affect them.  Part five concludes the article. 
II. CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
To put the issues in perspective, I begin this article with some case 
studies. Analyzing the extent of atrocities that has plagued mineral 
exploitation in the DRC, Margot Wallstrom observed that “the num-
ber of women and children raped in the DRC has risen dramatically 
because of a surge in rebel militia activity. . .in times of fighting you 
usually see also rape, refugees, stealing, killing and the burning of 
houses going up.”6  It seems, therefore, that the proceeds of mineral 
 6.  E.g., DR Congo Rape Study ‘Questionable’, BBC (May 18, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13448513 (reporting that Margot 
Wallstrom described DR Congo as “the rape capital of the world”). 
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exploitation are controlled and go to the warlords who can appropri-
ate it. Still on the DRC, a Congolese gynecologist, Dennis Mukwege, 
has become so distraught with the stories he gets from his patients. 
One of them goes thus:  
Every day, ten new women and girls who have been raped show up at the 
hospital. Many have been so sadistically attacked from the inside out, 
butchered by bayonets and assaulted with chunks of wood, that their re-
productive and digestive systems are beyond repair. . .the culprits are de-
scribed as young men with guns. . .home grown militias called the Mai-
Mai who slick themselves with oil before marching into battle. . .my old-
est patient was 75, youngest 3. Some of these girls whose insides have 
been destroyed are so young that they don’t understand what happened to 
them. They ask me if they will ever be able to have children, and it’s hard 
to look into their eyes.7 
While countries in the Global North, with or without oil, have 
been more peaceful and prosperous, many countries in the Global 
South, particularly those with vast natural resources are getting poor-
er, and domestic growth is declining at an alarming proportion.8 For 
these countries, extracting resources tends to energize corruption, 
damage institutions, and destroy social fabric.9 The vast natural re-
sources do not commensurate with the level of poverty and quality of 
life of their citizens. 
In Nigeria, the Ogoni experience has shown how a community can 
suffer tremendous environmental degradation due to the deleterious 
effects of corporate bodies.  This community was able to achieve its 
crusade against the then Nigeria’s military junta and major oil com-
 7.  Jeffrey Gentleman, Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 7, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/world/africa/ 07congo. 
html. 
 8.  See Evolution of average income in Gabon, 1950-2015, WORLD WEALTH 
& INCOME DATABASE, http://wid.world/country/gabon/ (charting Gabon’s average 
income and showing it has fallen by half since 1976); see generally African Eco-
nomic Outlook 2013: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources, supra 
note 2, at 92-93, 122, 163-65, 178-79, 181-82 (describing the stymied growth of 
various African nations due in large part to Guerilla warfare). 
 9.  See Ivar Kolstad & Arne Wig, Testing the Pearl Hypothesis: Natural Re-
sources and Trust, 37 RESOURCES POL’Y 358, 358-67 (2012) (arguing that an indi-
rect influence of natural resources on trust is mediated by inequality, corruption 
and civil war). 
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panies10 through social movements such as the Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP).11  The comprehensive United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) report in its assessment of 
about 200 locations in Ogoni found that due to the decades of oil ex-
ploration and blowouts, oil spillage, oil slicks, gas flaring, and waste 
discharge, the once alluvial soil of the Niger-Delta is no longer via-
ble for agricultural use and attributes the widespread decay land deg-
radation.12 Yet, shortly after Nigeria’s independence in 1960, Nigeria 
had a robust agricultural industry. The country relied on agricultural 
produce for sustenance and was the world’s leading exporter of palm 
oil and ground nuts.13 Since the discovery of crude oil, however, the-
 10.  E.g., The Ogoni Crisis: A Case-Study of Military Repression in Southeast-
ern Nigeria, HUM. RTS. WATCH 1 (1995), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/ 
1995/Nigeria.htm [hereinafter The Ogoni Crisis] (noting MOSOP’s confrontations 
against the government and major oil companies, most notably Shell Oil); see, e.g., 
Olof Linden & Jonas Palsson, Oil Contamination in Ogoniland, Niger Delta, 42 
AMBIO 685, 685-701 (2013) (analyzing the impact and extent of oil pollution in 
Ogoniland); accord RHUKS AKO, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM AFRICA AND ASIA-PACIFIC 23-41 (2013) (dis-
cussing the substantive and procedural issues related to environmental justice in 
Nigeria); see Susana C. Mijares Pena, Human Right Violations by Canadian Com-
panies Abroad: Choc v. Hudbay Minerals Inc., 5 W. J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 1-19 
(2014) (arguing that tort liability should exist for human rights violations that re-
sult from corporate activities abroad); see also Barisere Rachel Konne, Inadequate 
Monitoring and Enforcement in Nigerian Oil Industry: The Case of Shell and 
Ogoniland, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 181, 181-204 (2014) (detailing the conflict be-
tween the Ogoni people and Shell Oil). 
 11.  Timothy Hunt, The Politics of Bones: Dr. Owens Wiwa and the Struggle 
for Nigeria’s oil (McClelland & Stewart 2006); Hari M. Osofsky, Learning from 
Environmental Justice: A New Model for International Environmental Rights, 24 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 1-58 (2005); e.g., OBIORA CHINEDU OKAFOR, LEGITIMIZING 
HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS: LESSONS FROM NIGERIA 39-41 (2006) (explaining the ori-
gins and emergence of MOSOP); see, e.g., MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE 
OGONI PEOPLE, http://mosop.org/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2016) [hereinafter 
MOSOP] (providing further information about the Ogoni people); see generally 
Fons Coomans, The Ogoni Case Before the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 749, 749-60 (2003) (highlighting the Af-
rican Commission’s promotion of strong economic, social, cultural and collective 
rights for individuals in African countries). 
 12.  See Environmental Assessment of Ogoniland, U.N. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROGRAM 9-12 (2011), http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_ 
OEA.pdf (summarizing UNEP’s field observation and scientific investigation find-
ings). 
 13.  E.g., Palm Oil Value Chain Analysis in the Niger Delta, FOUNDATION FOR 
PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVES IN THE NIGER DELTA (PIND) 1 (2011), 
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se products disappeared. Nigeria, a land of exceptionally fertile oil, 
remains a net importer of food today.14 
In South Africa, the Marikana incident started as a wildcat strike 
by workers working at a mine owned by Lonmin, a British compa-
ny.15 The company has spent large sums of money on a massive pro-
gram of expansion, which left it financially vulnerable.16 It then fired 
12,000 striking South African miners after a protracted strike over 
wages. This incident led to sporadic strikes across the South African 
mining sector. The strike arose out of poor labor standards. Workers 
and the local communities were not receiving the dividends of min-
ing and good corporate behavior was absent; youth unemployment 
was on the increase, the living conditions of the mineworkers was 
appalling, and growing inequalities were evident.17 The strike that 
ensued saw about forty-four platinum miners shot dead by the South 
African police on August 16, 2012.18 Black workers are exploited 
http://www.ndpifoundation.org/images/researchreports/reports/Palm-Oil-Value-
Chain-Analysis.pdf (“Up until the 1960s, Nigeria was the world’s largest producer 
of palm oil accounting for 43% of global palm oil production.”). 
 14.  Simon Utebor, Nigeria Spends $22 bn yearly on Food Imports, PUNCH 
(Sept. 12, 2016), http://punchng.com/conoil-urges-safe-driving-sallah/. 
 15.  See  Proclamation No. 50 of 2012, Published in Government Gazette No. 
35680 of 12 September 2012, “Marikana Commission of Inquiry: Report on Mat-
ters of Public, National and International Concern arising out of the Tragic Inci-
dents at the Lonmin Mine in Marikana, in The North West Province,”  
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/marikana-report-1.pdf (last visited March 
17, 2017). See also Oli Abegunde, Causal Factors and the Dynamics of Resource 
Conflicts in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Niger Delta and Marikana¸ 3 INT’L 
J. HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. INVENTION 27, 33-34 (2014) 
(In late January to February 2012, there was tensions between the traditional miners’ 
union, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the younger AMCU over 
strikes and call[s] for pay rises at the Impala platinum mine in Rustenburg in which 
AMCU was accused of using violent tactics and of trying to impede negotiations to 
further its own membership drive by unions such as NUM which has been losing sup-
port.). 
 16.  See Lonmin: About Us, https://www.lonmin.com/about-us/about-us-
overview (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (stating that Lonmin’s core operations consist 
of “eleven shafts and inclines” situated in the Bushveld Igneous Complex in South 
Africa, which hosts “nearly 80% of global PGM resources”). 
 17.  See Lonmin an Example of Exploitation, SAPA (Aug. 17, 2012), 
http://www.iol.co.za/business-report/companies/lonmin-an-example-of-
exploitation-1365221#.Vj2FX_mrTIW (citing “lack of employment opportunities 
for local youth, squalid living conditions, unemployment and growing inequalities” 
as contributing to exploitation of the mines). 
 18.  Miners Shot Down, UHURHU PRODUCTIONS (May 30, 2014), 
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and work like slaves as rock drillers to this day. Poverty forces many 
of them to forget their ambition and leave school.19  
Extractive resource governance has been a significant challenge 
for countries in the Global South. While corporate organizations lack 
moral and social license to operate, states fail to defend their citizens 
against corporate culture of impunity. In drawing a sharp distinction, 
Leif Weiner argues that compared to resource curse, climate change 
looks easy.20 With climate change, the causes and cures are easily 
understood, the solution would be to “reduce the sum by reducing the 
summands.”21 For extraction of natural resources, the supply chain 
which determines the end users is difficult to account for who and 
what went wrong. Those who extract resources sell to manufactures 
who then sell to retailers and eventually gets to the consumers. How 
then does one determine the guilty party in this chain of distribution? 
For instance, most, if not all Apple products today bear the inscrip-
tion: “Made in China” but “Designed in California.” The complexity 
in this demarcation is that Apple has successfully created a disclaim-
er for any minerals used in the manufacture of its products. These 
minerals could have been sourced from the DRC, thereby indirectly 
contributing to ethnic wars over minerals. 
If these extractive resources are managed well in the Global South 
(which they are often not), they risk contaminating or poisoning the 
air and water, degrading the environment, and dislocating livelihoods 
and cultural practices of local communities. Gas flaring, strip mines, 
oil pollution, and acid rain are examples of the damage exploration 
of natural resources can cause.  Thus, extractive industries have the 
capability to distort and damage the natural order of things. Only an  
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cbvHU3wxj4E (showing live footage of the 
shooting). 
 19.  Id.; see Liduduma’lingani Mqombothi, “Miners Shot Down;” A Haunting 
and Emotional Documentary, AFRICA IS A COUNTRY (May 30, 2014), 
http://africasacountry.com/2014/05/miners-shot-down-a-haunting-and-emotional-
documentary/ (highlighting the poverty by describing Lonmin management’s re-
fusal “to negotiate with the rock drillers’ demands of R12,500 per month” as the 
core reason for the strike and violence). 
 20.  LEIF WENAR, BLOOD OIL: TYRANTS, VIOLENCE, AND THE RULES THAT 
RUN THE WORLD (Oxford Univ. Press 2015). 
 21.  Id. at xxiii. 
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effective and extractive resource management can prevent the nega-
tive externalities associated with extractive resource project.  
A. CONCERTED EFFORTS TOWARDS NORM IMPLEMENTATION 
The examples from the preceding section reveals the culture of 
impunity by States and MNCs in the extractive resource governance 
in some countries of the Global South, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. While some countries have done fairly well within this classi-
fication, Botswana, Bolivia, and Ecuador for instance, most African 
states still grapple with leadership and governance management. The 
polarized debate on the binding versus voluntary nature of the Guid-
ing Principles questionably share the same goal – to strengthen ac-
countability for business-related abuses, however, they only adopt 
significantly different approaches in achieving that goal. The forego-
ing is based on two salient observations: Firstly, State governments 
in Africa are unwilling to enforce their domestic laws or court judg-
ments when it comes to business and human rights disputes.22 Unfor-
tunately, this is where our efforts should be focused. Rather than ex-
ternalize responsibility and allow the African continent to be treated 
like eternal children seeking protection from adults who are miles 
away from their borders, African leaders should focus attention on 
implementation programs and policies. Today, Bolivia and Ecuador 
are under leftist governments, they exercise their sovereignty, yet 
they ensure that the dignity of their populations is more paramount. 
African leaders can do the same. Extractive resource management in 
Africa should not be done by proxy in the Global North. For in-
stance, courts in the United States, and lately, the Netherlands, are 
enforcing their laws on behalf of Ogoni people and other human 
rights violations occurring abroad, while Nigeria would not, neither 
will they conduct due diligence on companies and negotiate better 
 22.  See Gbemre (on behalf of Iwheraken Community, Delta State) v. Shell Pe-
troleum Dev. Corp. (2005) FHC/B/CS/53/05 21 (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (noting that the 
Attorney-General of Nigeria regrettably did not put up any appearances, and/or de-
fend the proceedings); see generally Gas Flaring Lawsuit (re: Oil Companies in 
Nigeria), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., https://business-
humanrights.org/en/gas-flaring-lawsuit-re-oil-companies-in-nigeria (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2015) (explaining Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Dev. Corp. and showing the 
earliest attempt at seeking judicial enforcement of human rights violation by vic-
tims of corporate abuse). 
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contractual deals on behalf of its citizens.23 
Secondly, MNCs were simply unprepared for the need to manage 
the risks of causing or contributing to environmental rights harm 
through their own activities and business relationships, hence the 
numerous litigations against them. The fact that this is being litigated 
means that the MNCs find it difficult to adapt to changing circum-
stances under the business and human rights regime. Firms operate in 
highly challenging contexts. When things go wrong, the companies 
are quick to blame the local community of sabotage. On the other 
hand, the indigenous people claim that the companies are not doing 
enough in terms of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The simple 
logic therefore is if the companies treat the local communities very 
well, these communities will in turn accept the companies and volun-
tarily provide security for company the firm’s installations. Weak 
zones can function as “law-free zones” where human rights viola-
tions are subject only to self-restraint and litigation in another juris-
diction “based on statutes with extra-territorial reach.”24 The ques-
tions that follow therefore are why do companies behave the way 
they do when it comes to respect for human rights? Where the States 
fail to fulfill their duty of protecting human rights, should firms also 
contribute to the failure of the State to uphold certain basic minimum 
standards of behavior. These questions lead us to briefly examine the 
implication of non-implementation of normative structures set by the 
United Nations. 
B. BASIS FOR COMPLIANCE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Theories define a concept and through them, we see the underly-
ing perception behind a notion. Although the theories surrounding 
CSR have been developed since the 19th century,25 the concept con-
tinues to evolve as dynamics of globalization increases and economic 
 23.  See Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (con-
cluding that corporations can face liability for claims brought under the Alien Tort 
Statute); see also Rb. Gravenhge januari 2013 C/09/337050 m.nt. para. 5.1 (Ak-
pan/Royal Dutch Shell PLC) (Neth.) (rendering judgment that the SPDC commit-
ted a specific tort of negligence against Akpan). 
 24.  JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 33 (2013). 
 25.  VED P. NANDA & RALPH LAKE, THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS ). 
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freedom expands. With the increasing debate on business and human 
rights, CSR has created revolutionary responsibilities for corporate 
organizations. The enforcement of CSR initiatives has been nuanced 
by the understanding that the Westphalian regime allows states as 
duty bearers under international law. Since MNCs have no liability 
under international law, how may they be found culpable for interna-
tional human rights violations?26 While the MNCs domiciled in de-
veloped countries comply with all regulatory laws in their home 
countries, developing countries grapple with enforcing corporate 
codes of conduct.  It is not the intention of this work to discuss ex-
tensively the notion of CSR. Suffice it to say that the concept of CSR 
is pivotal to the actualization of the business and human rights agen-
da. However, considering the fact that the international community is 
becoming inundated with nefarious activities of MNCs operating in 
the extractive industries in weak and conflict zones, a brief discus-
sion of the reputational model of compliance will be carried out. 
1. Reputational Model 
In the business and human rights debate, the issue has been norm 
compliance against the argument that soft laws are not laws so to 
speak. States care about their reputation with international law.  A 
state is respected for being a strong democratic state if it recognizes 
the rule of law and enforcement of judicial decisions. Any State that 
does not respect its own laws will have leadership legitimacy prob-
lems. It is countries, not companies, that own natural resources; 
companies only help extract those resources for benefit of the coun-
tries primarily.27  
 
 26.  Cf. Eugene Kontorovich, Kiobel Surprise: Unexpected by Scholars but 
Consistent with International Trends, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1671, 1693 (2013-
2014) (arguing that many countries have backed away from requiring strict com-
pliance with international law for multinational corporations; for example, the 
United States reinforces this concept in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 133 S. 
Ct. 1659 (2013) which limited the principal of extraterritoriality for multinational 
corporations). 
 27.  See generally J.R. Mailey, The Anatomy of the Resource Curse: Predatory 
Investments in Africa’s Extractive Industries, ACCS SPECIAL REPORT 1-6 (May 
2015) (discussing the relationship between a multinational corporation and re-
source-rich African countries). 
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At the international level, unfortunately, there has not emerged an 
enforcement regime strong enough as obtainable under domestic 
state laws to enforce compliance with international law. The situation 
is more precarious when such rule of international law is one of nor-
mative value.28 To date, scholars of norm compliance have not been 
able to sufficiently address the synergy between law and normative 
values in the compliance debate. Most work has centered on why 
States obey international law; few works, if any, has extended that 
debate to the need to comply with commitments arising from norma-
tive structures agreed under the auspices of the United Nations.29 
States must have gone through some stages to arrive at legally en-
forceable agreement. The question that follows is why States would 
now find it difficult to commit or comply with solemnly agreed rules 
which they contributed to negotiate.30  
One emerging school of thought focuses on morality of states to 
obey international law.31 The principle of ‘uberrimae fidei’ in the law 
of contract stipulates that contracts must be carried out in good 
faith.32 At the onset, Ruggie engaged in a wide stakeholder attempt at 
contributing to the business and human rights debate. States would 
have rejected the move and decided not to be part of the consultation 
 28.   See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 213-15 (Oxford University 
Press, 2d ed. 2005) (providing an overview of different approaches to implement-
ing international law on the national level). 
 29.  Compare Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of Interna-
tional Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1840-72 (2002) (suggesting numerous reasons 
why states to decide to comply, or not comply, with international law), with Edu-
ardo Moisés Peñalver, The Persistent Problem of Obligation in International Law, 
36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 271, 274 (2000) (analyzing the legal obligation of states to 
comply with international law). 
 30.  Compare Oona Hathaway, Between Power and Principle: An Integrated 
Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 473-74 (2005) (suggesting 
many countries commit to international treaties primarily to increase their interna-
tional reputation), with Dinah Shelton, Law, Non-Law and the Problem of ‘Soft 
Law’, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 7-23 (Oxford U. Press, 2000) (highlighting 
states’ reluctance to sign treaties with binding legal obligations). 
 31.  Cf. Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey Interna-
tional Law?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1901, 1919 (2002-2003) (critiquing the moral obli-
gation theory, and suggesting states’ compliance is based on “prudential behav-
ior”). 
 32.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 115 
U.N.T.S. 331 (incorporating the concept expressly in the Vienna Convention). 
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process. It would be highly inappropriate to now critique the Princi-
ples as not having met the aspirations or considered the pressing 
challenges of the developing countries. It would be also incongruous 
to now determine that after participating in the events that led to the 
drafting of the Principles and their subsequent ratification by the 
Human Rights Council, states can now decide not to implement the 
provisions of the Guiding Principles. 
Numerous reasons account for States’ compliance with norms. 
Harold Koh identifies five reasons: coercion, self-interest, legitima-
cy, communitarianism, and discursive legal process.33 Burgstar on 
his part identifies three reasons: first, actor fears punishment of rule 
enforcers, second, the actor sees the rule as its own self-interest, and 
third, the actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed.34  
Two issues are common to these conjectures: self-interest and legit-
imacy. Bursgtar’s first assumption is hinged on the social choice the-
ory that people have to obey laws because the causative value of 
non-compliance far outweighs the benefits of complying. What then 
is self-interest in the terms of complying with norms?  MNCs find it 
easy to defy international norms because the best punishment they 
can get is sanctions. Over time, sanctions have proven not to be a 
very potent weapon in coercing MNCs to comply with norms, espe-
cially when such MNCs wield strong influential powers on States.   
States that refuse to comply with commitments under an agree-
ment could risk the possibility of making future commitments with 
other States. States value their sovereignty and by extension their 
reputation in the comity of nations. They would not want to mort-
gage their future by the actions they take today. States will therefore 
hesitate before compromising that reputation.35 This goes beyond the 
political leadership at any particular point in time. The reputational 
damage, once done, lives with the country for decades. The violation 
of any agreement, binding or non-binding, must carry severe reputa-
tional costs if one thinks of the future effect of non-compliance.36 It 
 33.  See Harold Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law 
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 623-34 (1998-1999). 
 34.  See Markus Burgstaller, Amenities and Pitfalls of a Reputational Theory of 
Compliance with International Law, 76 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 39, 47 (2007). 
 35.  Guzman, supra note 29, at 1849 (considering the level of reputational 
harm a state will receive if it violates international law). 
 36.  See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens?  An Economic 
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is in the light of the foregoing that this article argues that the Ruggie 
Framework places greater burden on the states in implementing hu-
man rights norm. This may result in a change in behavior for the 
states. Unfortunately, weak states are not eager to have this change in 
behavior due to benefits from corruption and non-existent institu-
tional mechanisms.   
III.THE BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
AGENDA: RENEWED FOCUS 
A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES:  
MATTERS ARISING 
Ruggie’s task was basically to: identify and clarify standards of 
corporate responsibility and accountability regarding human rights; 
elaborate on states’ roles in regulating and adjudicating corporate ac-
tivities; clarify concepts such as ‘complicity’ and sphere of influ-
ence; develop methodologies for human rights impact assessments; 
and consider state and corporate best practices.37 The SRSG, after 
wide spread consultations, eventually drafted the UN Guiding Prin-
ciples on Business and Human Rights (“GP”).38 On June 16, 2011, 
the United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution 17/4, en- 
 
Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1577-1601 (2000) (stating 
that obeying a norm imposes direct costs and conveys the reputational benefits, as 
well as the benefit of avoiding sanctions). 
 37.  Human Rights Council Res. 2005/69 (April 20, 2015). The Ruggie 
Framework refers to the Framework proposed by the Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary General (SRSG), Prof. John Ruggie, which encourages all non-state 
actors to mainstream human right norms into their areas of activities. 
 38.  See U.N. Hum. Rts. Office of the High Comm’r, Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect 
and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc HR/PUB/11/04 (2011) [hereinafter Imple-
menting the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework] (creating 
the first global standard for mitigating and remediating the adverse effects of hu-
man rights violation linked to business activities; see also KENAN INSTITUTE FOR 
ETHICS AT DUKE UNIVERSITY, The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Analysis and Implementation (2012), https://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/UN-Guiding-Principles-on-Business-and-Human-Rights-
Analysis-and-Implementation.pdf (discussing new issues that have arisen since the 
implementation of the Guiding Principles and opportunities to further the Princi-
ples, as well as discussion regarding the implementation of the Guiding Princi-
ples). 
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dorsed the GP for implementing the UN “Protect, Respect and Rem-
edy” Framework.39   
Implementation has become a challenge for developing countries 
due to corruption, administrative ineptitude, the need to attract for-
eign direct investment, weak implementation of the laws in exist-
ence, and a dearth of laws that can contend with the developments 
and dynamics of globalization.40  Furthermore, host states are unwill-
ing to access the remedies available under their laws due to the nega-
tive effect it could have on the MNCs and tendency to protect free 
flow of investments. Developing countries thus live under the im-
pression that any act inimical to the progress of MNCs will see them 
leave their country since the dictates of globalization permits them to 
do so.41 The question therefore is: who should bear responsibility for 
social responsibility?  
Several authors have recently proposed legally binding instru-
ments to be complied with by the MNCs. According to this latest 
voice, the aim is “to provide appropriate protection, justice and rem-
edy to the victims of human rights abuses directly resulting from or 
related to the activities of some transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises.”42  As a form of endorsement to this, the UN 
Human Rights Council called for the drafting of a binding instrument 
 39.  UN General Assembly Resolution A/HRC/RES/17/4, Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, (6 July 2011). [33rd 
meeting, 16 June 2011, Adopted without a vote]. https://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/un-human-rights-council-
resolution-re-human-rights-transnational-corps-eng-6-jul-2011.pdf  (last visited 
March 7, 2017). 
 40.  E.g., Oil Pipelines Act (2004) Cap. (O7), § 11(5) (Nigeria) (exemplifying 
that national laws provide remedies for individuals, however, these are the provi-
sion that states fail to implement). 
 41.  See Erin Elizabeth Macek, Scratching the Corporate Back: Why Corpora-
tions Have No Incentive to Define Human Rights, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 101, 
104-05 (2002) (stating that “a corporation’s wealth translates into power in a glob-
al economy”). But see PETER MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND 
THE LAW 105 (Oxford U. Press, 2d ed. 2007) (comparing the dependency theory 
with the bargaining theory, and suggesting that under the bargaining theory states 
may have more bargaining power with multinational corporations). 
 42.  Statement on behalf of a Group of Countries at the 24rd Session of the 
Human Rights Council, BUS. HUM. RTS. (Sept. 2013), http://business-
humanrights.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/statement-unhrc-legally-
binding.pdf [hereinafter Statement at the 24rd Session of the Human Rights Coun-
cil]. 
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on business and human rights.43 The call for this mandatory regime 
has created a vacuum in the operational culture of the MNCs, they 
are, therefore, left with a choice either to comply with mandatory 
norms or seize the hitherto socially responsible projects they have 
embarked upon. These gaps and the high incidents of human rights 
violations resulting from unconscionable contractual bargains have 
further increased the calls for a more transparent, accountable, and 
human rights based approach to mitigation of human rights viola-
tion.44   
African leaders must craft pragmatic measures to address the 
teething problems facing the African continent. As discussed earlier, 
the lessons of Ogoni do not seem to reverberate in addressing the so-
cial and environmental malaise of the continent. The African Mining 
Vision prides itself as a developmental mining approach that stream-
lines social linkages to benefit the continent.45 We seem to have for-
gotten rather too quickly that it was in the bid to build economic and 
social linkage to Nigeria’s development through unregulated busi-
ness practices that resulted in the disastrous testing of drugs on some 
children in Kano by Pfizer.46 In that case, Pfizer claimed to have re-
sponded to an emergency, the outbreak of bacterial meningitis, mea-
sles, and cholera. The medical professionals who operated during 
this period claimed that children were camped in filthy conditions in 
hospitals lacking electricity and adequate water.47 Yet Pfizer only 
claimed to be doing CSR, albeit in an uncontrolled manner.48  
When Africa says it needs intervention, without manifest determi-
 43.  See Human Rights Council Res. 26/9 (June 26, 2014). 
 44.  Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, Governments, Investors and Local Commu-
nities: Analysis of a Multi-Actor Investment Contract Framework, 15 MELB. J. 
INT’L L. 473 (2014); see generally James Thuo Gathii, Incorporating the Third 
Party Beneficiary Principle in Natural Resource Contracts, 43 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 93 (2014-2015) (proposing that the Third Party Beneficiary Principle 
should be recognized and applied in contracts between developing countries and 
MNCs to create proper standing for violations). 
 45.  See African Mining Vision, About AMV, U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION 
FOR AFRICA http://www.africaminingvision.org/about.html (providing the African 
Mining Vision’s mission and purpose). 
 46.   See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16126, at *3-14 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005). 
 47.  Id. at *3-16. 
 48.  See id. at *43-52. 
 
ABE ACTUALLY FOR PRINT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/30/2017  2:46 PM 
2017] UNTYING THE GORDIAN KNOT 911 
nation to solve its problems, the continent will continue to be treated 
as a child that needs to be helped consistently. From Zimbabwe’s 
president that has refused to leave office despite plunging the country 
into chaos and economic misery, to the case of the DRC earlier men-
tioned, the continent will only continue to succumb to the Global 
North’s perception of an infantile continent bogged down by out-
landish dogma. In any case, it has not been all bad news for Africa, 
though, as Botswana has shown a remarkable improvement from its 
shackles of imperialist dogma to show how to manage resources ef-
fectively. Botswana has one of the highest economic growth rates 
since independence. Botswana’s economy depends on mineral re-
sources.49 Through fiscal discipline and sound economic manage-
ment, Botswana has transformed itself from one of the poorest coun-
tries in the world to a middle-income country with a per capita GDP 
of $16,900 in 2016.50 Where MNCs are interested in mining, they 
must follow the terms laid down by the host country. Such terms 
must also have the input of the citizens through local community par-
ticipation. Mining rights should belong to the indigenous people. If 
this is the case, most litigants that would flood the courts would be 
the MNCs as against the local community. The tide should change 
now. This was the situation in Bolivia when the President announced 
the intent to re-nationalize the Bolivian hydrocarbon assets.51 Local 
laws must be enforced and the rights of indigenous peoples guaran-
teed. The solution to Africa’s problem lies and belongs to Africa. Af-
ter years of colonization, infrastructural development has declined 
tremendously, a form of neo-colonization is entrenched. Favoritism 
and nepotism has become the order of the day, while corruption is 
growing geometrically. Scholarship should be devoted more to ascer-
tain concerns about Africa’s denial of self-responsibility, still at an 
infantile state, rather than begging favors from the international 
community often. 
 49.  See The World Facebook: Africa: Botswana, CIA (2017), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bc.html (stating 
that diamond mining “accounts for one quarter of GDP, approximately 85% of ex-
port earnings”). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See Push for New Bolivia Constitution, BBC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2006), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5251306.stm (stating the purpose of the new 
constitution was to give “more power to the indigenous majority”). 
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IV.LOCAL COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN 
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 
A. DIALECTICS OF NATURAL RESOURCE EXPLORATION IN 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES VIS-À-VIS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
While the developed societies have done fairly well in managing 
their resources, developing countries continue to grapple with the 
challenges of resource development in the face of huge financial in-
centives from MNCs. Global and national efforts are needed to limit 
excessive misuse of natural resources in developing countries. Most 
weak economies lower human rights standards so that MNCs can op-
erate in their countries. Short-term gains in these countries are illuso-
ry and undermine longer term recovery.52 The long and uncontrolled 
governance gaps embolden MNCs to operate without sanctions or 
caution.   
Extractive industries do not provide effective complaints mecha-
nisms for grievances related to their activities. This results in the ina-
bility of communities affected by their operations to seek for justice 
at the local level in the first instance. Resource wealth in Africa, 
where not efficiently managed, can lead to unstable growth, macroe-
conomic instability,53 high rates of unemployment, poverty, inequali-
ty,54 environmental degradation, resource-related conflicts,55 and en-
trenched corruption.56 The so-called ‘resource curse’ theory captures 
 52.  See Paul Stevens & Evelyn Dietsche, Resource curse: An Analysis of 
causes, experiences and possible ways forward, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 56, 58 (2008) 
(explaining that the current GDP rebasing of the Nigerian economy and the indica-
tors from other resource-rich African countries does not support the argument that 
natural resources contribute to the development of a nation as evident in developed 
nations). 
 53.  E.g., Carolyn Jenkins, Growth, Capital Accumulation, and Economic Re-
form in South Africa, in RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
239, 240-42 (R.M. Auty ed., Oxford U. Press 2001) (describing South Africa’s de-
celerate economic growth). 
 54.  See Michael L. Ross, How Mineral-Rich States Can Reduce Inequality, in 
ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 249, 252 (Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. 
Sachs, & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Colum. U. Press 2007) (highlighting vertical ine-
quality in mineral-resource rich countries). 
 55.   See Paul Collier & Anke Hoefler, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 
46.1 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 13, 16-17 (2002) (analyzing the connection countries that 
export primary commodities and the risk of conflict). 
 56.  See Terry Lynn Karl, Ensuring Fairness: The Case of a Transparent Fis-
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these ill effects of resource-dependence in developing countries.57 In 
contrast, developed countries have demonstrated the capacity to im-
plement and enforce their laws and policies and engage local com-
munities in the extraction of natural resources.58 A former Hallibur-
ton executive, Albert Stanley is currently serving a two-and-a-half-
year jail term after he pled guilty in a US federal court to orchestrat-
ing a $180 million bribery scheme to secure $6 billion in natural gas 
deals in Nigeria.59 The investigation of the bribes traversed four con-
tinents (Europe, US, Japan, and Nigeria) over the period of ten years 
and involved five companies in this countries.60 Criminal and civil 
penalties in the case have yielded more than $1.7 billion in fines, for-
feitures and other sanctions.61 In Nigeria, where the contract and 
bribery took place, investigations have been shrouded in secrecy. 
Nobody has been prosecuted and the citizens continue to wallow in 
cal Social Contract, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 256, 266 (Macartan Hum-
phreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Colum. U. Press 2007) (noting 
the lack of transparency when governments are connected to oil extraction). But 




EGY%20PAPER.pdf (stating that “as a result of this solid economic management 
and low levels of corruption (see Section 2), Botswana has earned consistently 
high credit ratings from rating agencies”). 
 57.  The resource curse refers to a situation where resource-dependent coun-
tries grow slowly, lack economic diversification, suffer from environmental degra-
dation, experience corruption, undergo violent conflict, and local communities, 
mainly indigenous peoples and women, do not fully participate in decision-
making. See generally Humphreys et al., Introduction: What is the Problem with 
Natural Resource Wealth, in ESCAPING THE RESOURCE CURSE 1 (Macartan Hum-
phreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., Colum. U. Press 2007) (ex-
plaining the phenomenon of the resource curse). 
 58.  Cf. Lee Godden et al., Accommodating Interests in Resource Extraction: 
Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities, and the Role of Law in Economic and 
Social Sustainability, 26.1 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCE L. 1, 3, 9-10 (2008) (pre-
senting evidence of key themes which help accommodate indigenous interests in 
relation to resources). 
 59.  John Rudolf, Robert Stanley, Former Halliburton Exec, Sentenced in Brib-
ery Scheme, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/24/albert-stanley-halliburton-kbr-bribery-
sentence_n_1299760.html (reporting on the investigation and Halliburton’s sen-
tence). 
 60.  See id. 
 61.  See id. 
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abject poverty. Yet, it is these same international communities that a 
country like Nigeria runs to for help in mitigating, addressing and 
remediating human rights standards. Still in the US, the CEO of a 
mining company in West Virginia is headed to jail for a mine acci-
dent that claimed ten miners lives.62  Likewise, the CEO of a power 
company in North Carolina is in trouble for releasing coal ash into 
ecosystems in the area.63 There is no hard-fast rule to achieving ex-
tractive resource governance other than enforcing laws and setting a 
precedent to deter future governance gap evident in this industry. 
B. INCORPORATION OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN EXTRACTIVE 
RESOURCE GOVERNANCE  
1. Court Assisted Process 
One would have expected that potential litigants from low-income 
countries would find succor in the courts in enforcing their funda-
mental human rights. For example, the court systems in Nigeria and 
South Africa are not sufficiently equipped to entertain disputes aris-
ing from multijurisdictional or transnational contracts signed by in-
vestors and states.64 While the judges may not be versed in the dy-
namics surrounding that type of system, most court systems in the 
Global South do not have the expertise to handle such conflicts. 
Apart from corruption, litigants, mostly indigenous people do not 
have the financial capability to prosecute their case. What difference 
 62.  See Alan Blinder, Mixed Verdict for Donald Blankenship, Ex-Chief of 
Massey Energy, After Coal Mine Blast, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3. 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/04/us/donald-blankenship-massey-energy-
upper-big-branch-mine.html?_r=0 (describing the charges brought against the CEO 
and its unprecedented nature). 
 63.  See Case Summary: Duke Energy Agrees to $3 Million Cleanup for Coal 
Ash Release in the Dan River, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/case-
summary-duke-energy-agrees-3-million-cleanup-coal-ash-release-dan-river (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Case Summary: Dan River] (providing infor-
mation about the Eden Ash Spill, the power company and the fine imposed against 
the company by the environmental protection agency). 
 64.   Ruth Hopkins, Broken Beyond Imagination: South Africa’s Justice Sys-
tem, DAILY MAVERICK (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/ 
2014-04-14-broken-beyond-imagination-south-africas-justice-system/#.Whwe 
BFUrLIU; see Assessment of the Integrity and Capacity of the Justice System in 
Three Nigerian States, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME 161-62 (Jan. 2006) (high-
lighting the fact that the Nigerian law is silent on the validity of contracts). 
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would it make in a country such as Nigeria where there is no theoret-
ical sophistication or philosophical dimension on the bench, where 
techniques rules and judges are all too dominated by a crude Aus-
tenian legal positivist jurisprudence! What is the imaginativeness re-
quired to understand standing in a way that would make even the 
Ruggie Principles slightly meaningful? To avert this disaster, Liti-
gants thence find themselves caught up between ineffective judicial 
system and continued violation of their human rights by MNCs. To 
escape this dilemma, some litigants have approached courts in the 
Global North to enforce their human rights.65  
 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum,66 the U.S. Supreme Court 
regrettably held that corporations are immune from tort liability for 
violations of the law of nations such as torture, genocide or extra ju-
dicial killings. Since corporate liability has not attained a discernible, 
much less universal acceptance among nations of the world, it cannot 
form the basis of a suit under the Alien Tort Statute.  Thankfully, in 
Doe v. Nestle USA INC,67 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the ninth cir-
cuit overturned an earlier order in the case which had dismissed the 
plaintiff’s case brought under the Alien Tort Statute. The action was 
brought by former child soldiers who were forced to harvest cocoa in 
the Ivory Coast.68 They alleged that the defendant corporations aided 
and abetted child slavery by providing assistance to Ivorian farm-
ers.69 Though the court found that there was no categorical rule of 
corporate immunity or liability, courts can look to international law 
and determine whether corporations are subject to the norms under-
lying that claim.70  The court therefore took the view that the prohibi-
tion against slavery was universal and could be asserted against cor-
porate defendants in this case.71 Interestingly, the court concluded 
that the plaintiff’s allegations satisfied the more stringent “purpose” 
 65.  E.g., Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(holding a cause of action was not adequately plead under the Alien Tort Act by 
Malians children who were forced to work in labor camps in Cote d’Ivoire). 
 66.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013). 
 67.  Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding 
“corporations can face liability for claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute”) 
withdraw, Doe I v. Nestle USA, 766 F.3d. 1013, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 68.  See Doe I v. Nestle USA, 766 F.3d at 1016-17. 
 69.  See id. at 1017. 
 70.  See id. at 1018, 1020. 
 71.  See id. at 1022. 
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standard by suggesting that a myopic focus on profit over human 
welfare drove the defendants to act with the purpose of obtaining the 
cheapest cocoa possible, even it meant facilitating child slavery.72 
This was a grand opportunity the Supreme Court lost in the Kiobel 
case to address the issue of corporate liability under international 
law. This is however a welcome development. Cases such as this will 
no doubt drive the business and human rights agenda positively for-
ward. 
The issue of environmental pollution and guerrilla warfare in min-
eral resource rich zones are issues of humanitarian tragedy. The ef-
fects of climate change and conflicts are issues wide and extensive 
literature has covered. Hundreds of thousands of innocent lives have 
been lost as a result of extraction of natural resources from these 
zones.73 Besides moral implications, the thinking that companies are 
only out there to make profits must have found nauseating implica-
tion in the minds of the judges as they referred to that idea as “myop-
ic.”74 
The unfathomable thinking is that some firms believe that respect 
for human rights norms would inhibit global trade and development. 
In the United States, for instance, the Bush and Obama administra-
tions fought relentlessly against the application of the Alien Tort 
Statute to cases of human rights violations abroad.75 Their argument 
was that such suits in federal courts raise serious foreign policy con-
cerns.76 The amicus briefs filed by the US governments in the Kiobel 
Case was on the basis that the courts, by entertaining these cases, 
 72.  See id. at 1024-26 (refusing to decide whether the purpose or knowledge is 
the appropriated standard to assess aiding and abetting, but agreeing that this was 
egregious enough that would have satisfied the heightened purpose standard). 
 73.  See, e.g., Patrick MacNeill, Overview of the Project Undertaken at the 
NSW Department of Primary Industries as a Vacation Industrial Work Experience 
Project, INT’L MINING FATALITY DATABASE 21-23 (2008) (charting the number of 
fatalities experiences in various countries due to coal mine accidents). 
 74.  Doe I v. Nestle USA, 766 F.3d at 1026. 
 75.  See, e.g., Mark A. Drumbl et al., The Alien Tort Claims Act Under Attack, 
98 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 49, 51 (2004); Jack Goldsmith, The Contributions of the 
Obama Administration to the Practice and Theory of International Law, 57.2 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1,4 (2016) (discussing the Obama administration’s stance on var-
ious international issues). 
 76.  See Drumbl et al., supra note 75, at 51 (citing the Bush administration as 
claiming the lawsuits would “threaten to bankrupt the world economy and serious-
ly impede the conduct of foreign relations”). 
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were acting inconsistently with the US foreign policy of promoting 
US investors abroad.77 Thus, the argument that human rights rules 
are in conflict with development needs to be rejected at the earliest 
stage. 
The primary duty to protect human rights falls on the state. How-
ever, in the DRC case highlighted above, the state is not and has 
never been present.78 The resources are controlled by guerillas. Busi-
ness is still ongoing, and minerals are extracted and exported from 
the country. Cell phones are churned out in large quantities and the 
by-products of these properties are from minerals extracted mostly 
from these weak zones.79 If states are solely charged with human 
rights obligations, and the duty of due diligence falls on them, how 
do we ensure that the government of DRC has due diligence obliga-
tions to make sure those violations which are occurring in those 
places are attributable to the state? There are lots of problems in 
weak governance zones. Notably, bad actors who are mostly non-
state armed groups. 
Ruggies Principles reproduces the distinction between voluntary 
and binding initiatives. It creates a responsibility which rethinks how 
businesses should approach human rights.80  The problem with these 
rules is not that they are inadequate. It is a problem of enforcement. 
For instance, Nigeria has numerous rules and regulations on the best 
practices for managing the extraction of natural resources. However, 
 77.  See Brief for Respondent at 25-31, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2011) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL 6425363, at 25-31 [hereinafter 
Kiobel Brief]. 
 78.  See Gentleman, supra note 7 (“The justice system and the military still 
barely function, and United Nations officials say Congolese government troops are 
among the worst offenders when it comes to rape. Large swaths of the country . . . 
remain authority-free zones where civilians are at the mercy of heavily armed 
groups.”). 
 79.  See Cell Phone Mineral Answer Key, MINERALS EDUCATION COALITION 
(2013) https://mineralseducationcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/10_9_13cell 
phoneanswer.pdf (providing charts of the major mineral used to produce cell 
phones and the leading countries exporting those minerals). 
 80.  See generally John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-
General, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the 
United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/31, annex I, ¶¶ 1-15 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Ruggie, Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights] (listing and explaining the general 
principals). 
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these rules are only good on paper. The enforcement regime is either 
deficient or nonexistent. Apart from strengthening local institutions 
charged with domestic implementation and enforcement of these 
laws, what should be emphasized is that if an MNC goes to these 
weak zones, the mere fact that host countries do not enforce their 
laws should not be an avenue to aid and abet corrupt governments or 
turn a blind eye to human rights enforcements. MNCs should not dis-
regard these rules and principles. If these principles applied to the 
MNCs, the notorious Ogoni and Marikana disasters would not have 
occurred. In effect, therefore, if Nigerian government is violating the 
rights of indigenous peoples of the Niger-Delta, MNCs should not be 
complicit. This connivance should also extend to third parties direct-
ly responsible to the MNCs. This would erode the application of sep-
arate legal personality principle usually used by the MNCs to avoid 
liability. For example, an MNC employs the services of state funded 
security forces to protect its installations. In the process of protec-
tion, these forces become involved in human rights violations in the 
local community. It will be incongruous for the MNC to deny re-
sponsibility but instead allocate liability to the state as objects and 
those with sole obligation to protect human rights under international 
law. This raises some complications under domestic law. Although 
the Supreme Court dodged the question of corporate liability for the 
acts of third parties in the Kiobel case, drawing the nexus in that rela-
tionship is necessary in building the case for liability against 
MNCs.81 This the court did successfully so far in Doe v. Nestle USA, 
INC.82  
2. The Third-Party Beneficiary Rule 
Another way of incorporating legal frameworks in extractive re-
source governance is through the Third-Party Beneficiary Rule 
(TPBR). Contract law provides reciprocal responsibilities between 
 81.  See Kiobel, supra note 66. 
 82.  Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 738 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing the 
Second Circuit in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 
F.3d 244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009) which held that ‘‘a defendant may 
be held liable under international law for aiding and abetting the violation of that 
law by another when the defendant (1) provides practical assistance to the principal 
which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime, and (2) does so with 
the purpose of facilitating the commission of that crime’’). 
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both parties. Any party that is not privy to any contractual relation-
ship is not expected to enjoy benefits derivable from the contract. 
The reason for this is simple. Promises exchanged between consent-
ing people are meant to be carried out in good faith between those 
two people. Where one fulfills his obligations and the other does not, 
a breach of the contract has occurred. This gives rise to repudiation 
of the contract or other remedies available in contract law.83  Con-
tractual bargain therefore enhances the wealth of the contracting par-
ties as it creates value through exchange and allowing the contracting 
parties to make reliable plans.84 This invariably formed the basis for 
what has now been widely accepted as the doctrine of privity of con-
tract.85  
Under the TPBR, a third person, not a party to the contract can sue 
to enforce a promise made for his or her benefit under the contract, 
though he was not a party to the contract.86 In the United States, the 
 83.  See, e.g., GREG ABBOTT & DOUG COULSON, BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL 
LITIGATION § 19:172 (Tex. Prac. Guide 2016-2017); see generally David Camp-
bell, Better than Fuller: A Two Interests Model of Remedies for Breach of Con-
tract, 78 MOD. L. REV. 296 (2015) (arguing the restitution interest should be elimi-
nated as contract remedy); Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of 
Contract, 70 COLUMBIA L. REV. 1145 (1970) (providing remedies obtainable under 
contract law). 
 84.  See, e.g., Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 
95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 743-44 (1982) (discussing the benefits of bargaining); cf. 
Robert Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 1432, 1459-64 (1985) (explaining how various remedies act as incen-
tives to perform the contract). 
 85.  See Jesse W. Lilienthal, Privity of Contract, 1 HARV. L. REV. 226, 226-32 
(1887) (quoting Lake Ontario Shore Railroad Co. v. Curtiss, 80 N.Y. 219 (1880), 
“The general rule is, that when two persons, for a consideration sufficient as be-
tween themselves, covenant to do some act, which if done would incidentally re-
sult in the benefit of a mere stranger, that stranger has not a right to enforce the 
covenant, although one of the contracting parties might enforce it as against the 
other”). 
 86.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (Am. Law Inst. 1981) 
(noting “parties to a contract have the power, if they so intend, to create a right in a 
third party”); see also Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study 
of the Third Party Beneficiary R., 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1111-12 (1985) (stating 
that a third party’s ability to enforce a contract is a well-accepted concept in the 
United States); cf. Marissa Marco, Accountability in International Project Fi-
nance: The Equator Principles and the Creation of Third-Party-Beneficiary Status 
for Project-Affected Communities, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 452, 455 (2011) (sug-
gesting the Equator Principles should adopt the concept of third-party-beneficiary 
interests in order for communities to ensure compliance with the Equator Princi-
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TPBR has been applied in a number of cases.87 There is growing and 
emerging literature on this principle. What is important from the lit-
erature is the intention of the parties as at the time the contract was 
negotiated. Extractive resource contracts between the states and in-
vestors are for the exploration of natural resources within the State.  
Modern approach to the TPBR tends towards the applicability of 
the rule to resource extraction projects.  This is evident in low in-
come countries, particularly in Africa where landed property and 
natural resources belong to the State, though the State holds it in trust 
for use to the benefit of the people.88 Gathii’s seminal work on this 
rule four reasons why the TPBR should be applied to resource ex-
traction contracts.89  His most important reason is that the rule is con-
sistent with the wishes of the parties to the contract, though, he 
claims that this right of a third party is remedial and not substan-
tive.90  
Strictly, the application of the Rule goes beyond the mere inten-
tion of the parties.91 An extractive resource contract entered into be-
ples by MNCs). 
 87.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (providing for the 
recognition of the third party principle); see also Dutton v. Poole (1678) 83 Eng. 
Rep. 523 (K.B.) (finding a third party to be privy to the contract because she was 
the intended beneficiary); see also Maneely v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 623 (1929) 
(holding the plaintiff was an intended third-party beneficiary and was allowed to 
bring a claim for damages). 
 88.  See Land Use Act (1990) § 1, ch. 202 (Nigeria); see also Mineral and Pe-
troleum Resources Development Act of 2002, GG 23922, § 2 (10 Oct. 2002); see 
also Petroleum Exploration and Production Law (1984), § 1 (Ghana); see also 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA, (1996), § 257(6) (Ghana). 
 89.  See Gathii, supra note 44, at 114 (stating his four reasons that the TPBR is 
consistent with resource extraction are: (1) third party wishes are consistent with 
the wishes of the parties to the contract; (2) resource contracts are made for the 
benefit of the public; (3) it is necessary on the grounds of justice and mortality; and 
(4) it is essential on public policy grounds). 
 90.  See, e.g., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 
38, at ¶¶ 25. 
 91.  See Olson v. Etheridge, 686 N.E.2d 563, 569 (Ill. 1997) (adopting a mod-
ern view on the duty of a beneficiary to a contract, the Court held that third-
party beneficiaries to a contract only obtain vested rights in a contract when one of 
the three vesting circumstances set forth in section 311(3) Restatement (second) of 
Contracts is satisfied); see also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third-Party Beneficiaries, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358, 1378 (1992) (suggesting “intent” is ambiguous and is not 
clearly defined); cf. Patience A. Crowder, More Than Merely Incidental: Third-
Party Beneficiary Rights in Urban Redevelopment Contracts, 17 GEO. J. ON 
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tween government and investors which does not have the input of lo-
cal communities does not deserve the consideration of an academic 
critique. Local communities are ultimate beneficiaries of State pro-
jects. Due to the insensitivity of governments in the past, there have 
been high levels of distrust between local communities, governments 
and investors. However, throughout the planning, decision making, 
execution and implementation stages of the various projects, local 
communities were not aware of these projects. They have no suffi-
cient participatory rights, likewise, their enforceable rights are lim-
ited. Without entrenched local community participation in natural re-
source contract, the TPBR will be a mere charade.  
A new approach is thus suggested, which should mandate MNC to 
enter into contractual relationships with local communities through 
enforceable Memorandums of Understanding instead of the State. In 
the alternative, where they enter into contractual relationship with the 
State, there must be an incidental contractual relationship with the 
local community. It is in this context it can truly be said that the Rule 
has the intention of the citizens at heart. The rule will thence enjoy 
the concept of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ that is key to 
achieving the participatory development right under the United Na-
tions. In Canada, the indigenous populations known as First Nations 
are always consulted before any project in their locality is done.92 
African states must adapt this practice to their various local commu-
nities.  
Further, indigenous peoples have historically been cut off from 
any decisions that affect them. They thus become vulnerable, suffer-
ing from a lack of political representation and decision making con-
cerning matters that affects them.93 Even though these contracts con-
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 287, 287 (2010) (noting “community groups that seek to be-
come involved in city-sponsored redevelopment projects have limited avenues of 
participation from which to choose” and need to rely on the third-party beneficiary, 
even when their intention is different than the contracting parties). 
 92.  See Consulting with First Nations, BRITISH COLUMBIA (last accessed Feb. 
11, 2017), http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/natural-resource-
stewardship/consulting-with-first-nations (requiring consultation on “land and re-
source decision that could impact their aboriginal interests”). 
 93.  See Phillipe Hanna & Frank Vanclay, Indigenous Peoples and the Concept 
of Free, Prior and Informed Consent, 31 IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND PROJECT 
APPRAISAL 146, 152 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14615517.2013.780373 
(noting the implementation of free, prior and informed consent can create illusion 
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form to the wishes of the people, practically, the implementation is 
weak. If indigenous communities had been involved in the planning 
and execution of the contract, the enforcement of TPBR would have 
been easily implementable and naturally enforceable on the MNCs.94 
In adducing evidence in support of this assertion, Gathii claims that 
the financial resources obtained from investors through the contracts 
are used towards public projects, such as roads, or for paying for 
public education and health.95 As much as this is theoretically appli-
cable, the reverse is the case in local communities where resources 
are extracted. This has been the bane of failed CSR. Laws do not 
cure all of the social ills occasioned by globalization and the insatia-
ble quest for industrialization. The firm is not only a legal creation, 
but a moral compass with social and ethical responsibilities that ex-
tend to shareholders and other constituents in a state, including the 
local communities.96 The obligation of business is to consider, 
weigh, and balance the needs of the firm’s stakeholders97 Due to 
moral imperatives, a corporation must be able to balance these obli-
gations in a way that puts emphasis on the society. It is an undeniable 
fact that government representation of local communities, especially 
when it has to do with resource extraction projects, is often ludicrous 
due to lack of capacity, lack of interest or conflict of interest.98  Evi-
dence suggests that due to high level of corruption and weak govern-
it is being achieved, but in reality, excludes many community members from par-
ticipating in decision-making); see generally S. Mahanty, C.L. McDermott, ‘How 
does ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ (FPIC) Impact Social Equity? Lessons 
from Mining and Forestry and Their Implications for REDD+’, 35 LAND USE 
POLICY 406, (2013) (examining how the principle of “free, prior, and informed 
consent” has impacted social equality and why). 
 94.  Cf. George (Rock) Pring & Susan Y. Noe, The Emerging International 
Law of Public Participation Affecting Global Mining, Energy, and Resources De-
velopment, in DONALD M. ZILLMAN, ET. AL., HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATURAL 
RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT OF MINING AND ENERGY RESOURCES 59-64 (Oxford Univ. Press 
2002) (discussing the necessity of including the indigenous community’s participa-
tion in decision). 
 95.  See Gathii, supra note 44, at 116. 
 96.  See, e.g., LUO YADONG, GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 198-99 (Blackwell Publishing 2007) (highlighting that a corporate’s 
social responsibility is an ethical duty). 
 97.  See id. 
 98.  See Odumosu-Ayanu, supra note 44, at 478 (suggesting international 
standing exists and may be the best source of a legal resolution). 
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ance mechanisms, most constituent units of the federal republic enter 
into public-private initiatives in a way to indirectly expand infra-
structural developments in their space.99  
If a government truly enters into contracts on behalf of its people, 
then they should be direct beneficiaries of the proceeds of the con-
tracts. Accordingly, they should be allowed to sue on the contract. 
After all, the issue of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
lies with the people and not the government per se.100 Article 21(1) 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,101 guarantees 
the right of all peoples to freely dispose of their wealth and natural 
resources.102 This right is to be exercised in the exclusive interest of 
the people.103 This right is for the benefit of the people and it has to 
be exercised on behalf of the people. What this argument portends 
for Nigeria is that a people-centered agreement between MNCs and 
government that would drastically endanger the environment, citi-
zenry or communities are open to possible censure104. This point pro-
ceeds on the recognition that sustainable exploitation of the envi-
ronment takes cognizance of the rights of future generations yet 
unborn.  
 99.  Lagos is one of the 36 states in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. It is a 
cosmopolitan State and as such, there has been a pressure to develop the States in-
frastructure. Even in the face of federal governments neglect. The State has been 
able to pursue giant strides.  See Lagos Denies Terminating Controversial Conces-
sion Deal On Lekki-Epe Highway, WILL NEWSPAPER (Aug. 28, 2013), 
http://thewillnigeria.com/news/lagos-denies-terminating-controversial-concession-
deal-on-lekki-epe-highway/ (accessed 11 August, 2016) (providing the text of a 
press release regarding the deal from the Lagos government). 
 100.  See G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Re-
sources (Dec. 14, 1962); see also Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and 
Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 33, 66-67 (2006) (arguing that natural resource extraction should be 
at the benefit of the citizens of the nation). 
 101.  Org. of African Unity [OAU], African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights (Banjul Charter), art. 21(1), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 
(1982) (June 27, 1981), http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3630.html [hereinaf-
ter Banjul Charter]. 
 102.  See id. at art. 21(1). 
 103.  See id. 
 104.  See Abegunde, supra note 15, at 34 (stating that to avoid conflict and ex-
ploitation, the government, resource bearing community, natural resource workers, 
and multinational corporations must all be in agreement about terms of contracts 
and those terms must improve the living conditions of surrounding communities in 
the present and future). 
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Natural resource extraction activities in resource rich Global South 
countries are riddled with woes and conflict.  It is therefore not im-
mediately clear how the rule will attract justice and morality in a 
country such as Nigeria where value systems are deficient and cor-
ruption is the order of the day. Local communities lack interest in 
development projects even in their community. This is due to long 
years of deceit perpetrated by the government and insensitivity of the 
MNCs. Even where judgments are given, who bears the burden of 
enforcement particularly where the judgment is against the govern-
ment?105 The state has failed over the years and the institutional re-
forms needed have never been done and where it did, it never 
worked. Where the right institutions are put in place, practice will 
merge with theory. Furthermore, the socio-political, historical and 
economic history of the indigenous peoples contributes to the regime 
of non-inclusivity. Indigenous people must actively participate in the 
realization of their right to development.106  
3. Community Development Agreements 
Contracts are meant to be sacrosanct. The terms of any legally 
agreed contract must be complied with, exceptions being uncon-
scionable bargain or such agreements did not meet the thresholds of 
a valid contract.107 Community Development Agreements (CDAs) 
constitute another genre of contract.108 This type of agreement has 
become important considering the debate about the possibility of 
TPBR which would have been an exception to privity of contract. 
This agreement involves investors and communities. Unlike con-
 105.  See, e.g., Gbemre (on behalf of Iwheraken Community, Delta State) v. 
Shell Petroleum Dev. Corp. (2005) FHC/B/CS/53/05 21 (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (holding 
that respondents were restrained from “further flaring of gas in applicants’ com-
munity and are to take immediate steps to stop the further flaring of gas in the ap-
plicants’ community”). 
 106.  See G.A. Res. 41/128, ¶¶ 2-3 (Dec. 4, 1986) (providing that all individuals 
in a community have a right to participate in development). 
 107.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 17-18, 20, 22, and 
208 (showing that in most common law countries, for there to be a valid contract, 
there must be offer, acceptance, consideration, intention to enter legal relations and 
capacity to contract). 
 108.  See Leland T. Saito, How Low Income Residents Can Benefit from Urban 
Development: The LA Live Community Benefits Agreement, 11 CITY & 
COMMUNITY 129, 130 (2012) (discussing Community Benefit Agreements and ex-
amining the CBA’s impact on addressing structural inequality). 
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tracts between investors and governments, which gives rise to TPBR, 
this type of contract directly involves the community. Thus, the local 
community is involved in contract making. Besides, when investors 
enter into contract with government, they are legally allowed to carry 
out their exploration activities in the local community.109 While they 
possess this legal license, they do not have the social license to oper-
ate, hence the frequent and heightened tension between the investors 
and local communities. Social responsibility arises from social pow-
er. While it is true that MNCs may have the requisite legal basis for 
conducting activities in the extractive industries in Nigeria and South 
Africa, they certainly lack the social license to operate. This is evi-
dent in the Niger-Delta and Marikana incidents.110 Firms have the 
tremendous influence over governments especially when such pow-
ers extend to issues such as environment, community development 
and human rights.111 To avoid criminal or civil prosecution, manag-
ers must ensure their firms comply with relevant laws. By so doing, 
they avoid distracting court cases, punitive fines, and distrust from 
their host community.  
In March 2015, France passed a law mandating big supermarkets 
to sign contracts with a charity group to ensure donating food to 
charities instead of destroying those food that were not sold.112 The 
pertinent question is why do we need a law for something that seems 
logical? Since you do not use a product, give it to charity, you do not 
make a profit on it. Perhaps, the supermarkets could argue that if 
they give to charities for free, what they will not use again, though 
still edible, this could discourage individuals to give to those chari-
ties that would want to buy again in their own supermarket. There is 
something logical when making your business in the best way, look-
ing for what is in your best interest.  Those who therefore hold tena-
ciously to Friedman’s conception of the irrationality of CSR has lost 
 109.  See id. 
 110.  See Abegunde, supra note 15, at 32 (discussing the violent conflict of the 
Ogoni people in the Niger Delta). 
 111.  See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 38, at 
¶¶ 11, 13 (establishing that a business has the responsibility to respect human 
rights, avoid causing or contributing to violations of human rights, and prevent or 
mitigate any violations that are directly caused by its operations). 
 112.  See, e.g., France to Ban Food Waste in Supermarkets, AL JAZEERA (May 
22, 2015, 8:14 AM), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/05/france-food-waste-
supermarkets-150522070410772.html. 
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the deep meaning of evolution of ethical modernization which re-
sponsible firms are aligning with today.   
For victims of human rights violations, a basis for empowerment, 
participation in project execution and implementation and an avenue 
for assessing governments and business conduct are necessary for 
reversing the risks associated with resource exploitation. Some juris-
dictions have taken a step further to ensure that CDAs are statutorily 
provided for.113 Contracts that take cognizance of the rights of the in-
digenous peoples, thereby giving them an opportunity to negotiate 
terms of the contract, almost always have  
the potential to integrate the main stakeholders within one framework, 
address democratic deficits in the law and oil and gas regulation, allow 
actors to negotiate interests, benefits and obligations, facilitate cordial re-
lationships as well as responsibilities on the part of all the actors and the 
stronger relationships in turn contribute to sustainable exploitation of re-
sources and responsible management of project development.114 
Evidence lends support to the fact that negotiating CDAs has re-
versed negative impact of large projects which shows the disparities 
in the economic and political resources controlled by investors and 
local communities.115 CDAs have the potential of addressing the in-
terests of the local community. Even where the government through 
its agencies and parastatals have the best of intentions, MNCs have 
the capability to influence these officials so that they can subvert any 
positive development impact on the community. 
The West Africa Gas Pipeline project is an example that readily 
comes to mind. It is a regional pipeline project that transmits gas 
from Nigeria to Benin, Togo and Ghana.116 Undoubtedly, this type of 
project would lead to the destruction and/or relocation of properties. 
It would also have the potential of destroying livelihoods, damaging 
plantation and displacing residents from their homelands. The pro-
 113.  See Odumosu-Ayanu, supra note 44, at 491-92 (considering the effective-
ness of domestic statutes and regulations). 
 114.  Id. at 510. 
 115.  See Saito, supra note 108, at 129. 
 116.  See Treaty on the West African Gas Pipeline Project Between the Republic 
of Benin, the Republic of Ghana, the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and the Repub-
lic of Togo, Jan. 31, 2003, WAGP art. II(3) [hereinafter WAGP Treaty] (establish-
ing the governance system of the pipeline). 
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gram which started in 1982 was finally endorsed by the World Bank 
in 1992 as a commercial and feasible project, capable of supplying 
gas to the West African region.117 The Heads of the four African 
States signed an Agreement in 1995 and on August 11, 1999, a 
Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the governments of 
Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana.118 In February 2000, an Inter-
Governmental Agreement was signed.119  Furthermore, Clause 20.3 
of the WAGP International Project Agreement provides that land 
owners who are impacted by the activities of the Company or project 
and lose their lands as a result will be entitled to “fair compensation 
for disturbance or damage.”120 This might not be a much needed le-
gal empowerment for the local people, but it is a significant im-
provement from earlier practice where companies and States take 
land from the natives without recourse to any form of compensa-
tion.121  
 
 117.  See, e.g., Ese Awhotu, Gains, Constraints of the $1.8 Billion West Africa 
Gas Pipeline Project, ALL AFRICA (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200912020110.html (stating that there was some re-
sistance to the project because of political and economic uncertainties, but the sup-
port of the World Bank helped the countries involved come to an agreement over 
the project). 
 118.  See WAGP Treaty, supra note 116, preamble. 
 119.  See West African Gas Pipeline Act (2004) (681), § 13 (Ghana) (enacting a 
law that domestics the gas pipeline and providing that “The Company shall pay to 
any affected legitimate land owners or lawful occupiers of land entered pursuant to 
the exercise of the rights of the license holder under section 12, fair compensation 
for disturbance or damage caused by the activities of the Company or project con-
tractors on such land”); see generally About the Pipeline, WAPCO, 
http://wagpco.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=122&Itemid
=85 (providing details about the pipeline and it’s product). 
 120.  WAGP Treaty, supra note 116, art. 13(1). 
 121.  See, e.g., Natives Land Act 27 of 1913 § 10 (S. Afr.) (regulating the acqui-
sition of land by the native black people and being used as a tool by the then re-
pressive apartheid government to indicate that only certain areas of the country 
could be owned by the natives, but it has been replaced by the current land reform 
process which focuses on restitution, land tenure and land redistribution); see also 
William G. Moseley & Brent McCusker, Fighting Fire with a Broken Tea Cup: A 
Comparative Analysis of South Africa’s Land-Redistribution Program, 98(3) 
GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 322, 324-25 (2008) (discussing the Native Land Act); see 
also Klaus Deininger, Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience 
from Colombia, Brazil and South Africa, 27 WORLD DEV. 651, 652-53 668 (1999). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This article has considered various approaches aimed at ensuring 
that the Guiding Principles assist improved extractive resource gov-
ernance in the extractive sector. It has discussed problems that pre-
sent obstacles against the implementation of the Guiding Principles 
in the extractive resource industry in the Global South, particularly in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. These include corruption, civil conflict, and au-
thoritarianism. A consideration of the issues concerning corporate li-
ability for human rights violations borders on awareness that the 
companies should consider that they owe it a moral duty to abide by 
human rights norms and laws. Some may argue that the main pur-
pose of a company is to make profit. However, making profit does 
not translate to hurting human beings or damaging their means of 
livelihood. Where the activities of these MNCs would result in envi-
ronmental degradation and violation of human rights, companies 
must immediately remediate such acts.  While the Global South 
needs the cooperation of the Global North in development aid, coun-
tries in the Global South must show spirited efforts at addressing the 
challenges that face them domestically. African states, for instance, 
are managed by corrupt, inept and a cabal system. The citizens are 
continually impoverished and increasingly violent? 
States should be more concerned about both reputational and di-
rect sanctions for their conduct. They have an obligation to protect 
human rights by enforcing all human rights standards so as not to 
breach their commitments under international law. Unfortunately, 
UN treaties and Customary International Law do not provide for reg-
ulation of business enterprise.122  Admittedly, the Guiding Principles 
which guide corporate businesses, are not legally mandatory. A repu-
tational theory, however, would label as international law any com-
mitment that materially alters state incentives.123  These commit-
ments, allow us to understand the workings of international 
obligations within a reputational theoretical framework. It explains 
 122.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1031 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (stating that the ICJ shall decide cases in ac-
cordance with international law, conventions, customs, and general principles of 
law of civilized nations). 
 123.  See Guzman, supra note 29, at 1825. 
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why such agreements exist and why they are so popular.124 Resolu-
tions, declarations and agreements represent commitments by a state 
which, if breached, will have a reputational impact.125  With this in 
the background, human rights principles will become naturally man-
datory for the MNCs. The ultimate objective is to decrease the gap 
between developed and developing countries in managing extractive 
resources governance creditably. Local communities must be in-
volved and adequately represented in planning, execution and im-
plementation of resource extraction projects through either TPBR or 
Impact Benefit Agreements. Increasing participation of local com-
munities is key to the business and human rights agenda. No doubt, 
Memorandum of Understanding and CDAs, as argued in this paper, 
have the potential of addressing the interests of the local community.  
Until we de-emphasize financial incentive as the goal of political 
governance, turning resource wealth into improved standard of living 
for the people will only be a mirage. Issues of weak enforcement of 
rules and regulations, bad labor standards, environmental pollution, 
corruption, and lack of political will must be aggressively addressed. 
Hilson expresses the concern that most Sub-Saharan African coun-
tries encounter two major challenges which have impacted on their 
growth trajectory. First, the timing to bring extractive industries to 
fruition happened when the countries just attained independence. 
 124.  See id. 
 125.  The impact may even extend beyond the scope of the agreement. For ex-
ample, the Basel Accord was negotiated and agreed to by the central bankers of 
twelve countries in 1988. Although not a treaty and, as a result, not considered 
binding under traditional definitions of international law, a central banker whose 
country failed to supervise banking activity in a manner consistent with the Accord 
would surely face a loss of influence in the international regulation of banking and 
make it more difficult to enter into future negotiations. There is an incentive not to 
promise too much and an encouragement to honor such agreements. Such agree-
ments as this can change state behavior.  The reputational cost of a failure to honor 
the Basel Accord could easily extend beyond the banking arena.  To the extent that 
such action is perceived as a signal that a country does not take the promises of its 
negotiators seriously in the absence of a formal international legal commitment, 
such action could undermine all efforts to negotiate non-binding agreements. It 
should be noted that those who negotiate these agreements on behalf of their coun-
tries have the authority to bring domestic regulations into compliance with the 
agreements. See generally Duncan E. Alford, Basle Committee Minimum Stand-
ards: International Regulatory Response to the Failure of BCCI, 26 GEO. WASH. J. 
INT’L L. & ECON. 241, 259 (1992). 
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This significantly put the governments to a test.126 Instead of devel-
opment, the new-found wealth soon turned the fragile democracies 
into autocratic governments. A form of neo-colonialism emerged. 
Second, the financial burden occasioned by the huge investments in 
oil and gas projects deprived the fragile democracies of much needed 
financial reprieve to embark on the projects.127  
It is hoped that a fusion of the recommendations made in this work 
will untie the Gordian knot of self-enrichment of political leaders 
where the proceeds of oil are used to enrich themselves and leave the 
local community in anguish and impoverishment. These oil compa-
nies fully aware of the level of decadence in governance and with 
sophisticated machinery of lobby and maneuvering perpetuate dicta-
tors or democratic nuisance so they can continue their impunity. 
Contracts are shrouded in secrecy; award of development initiatives 
are carried out without regard to immediate needs of the local com-
munity.  
 
 126.  See Gavin Hilson, Corporate Social Responsibility in the Extractive Indus-
tries, Experiences from Developing Countries, 37 RESOURCES POL’Y 131, 133 
(2012) (analyzing how MNC have embraced corporate social responsibility in re-
sponse to criticism of their actions in developing countries). 
 127.  See id. 
 
